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Policies for Improving Quality in Supply Chain 
 
Abstract: 
This paper is aimed to analyse the problem associated with quality in a two-stage 
supply chain with one supplier and one manufacturer. Most cases in real life is not this 
simple, although for the propose of keeping easy for calculations, even if there’re 
several suppliers we can simplify it to only one supplier that provides different quality 
level products. A mathematic model is built to simulate the problem and we will 
analyse the problem into two real cases, which will be detailed in the paper. Finally, we 
aimed to get some conclusions from these cases.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Suppliers and manufacturers face a daily complex task of supervising the quality of raw 
material or components in their production lines. At supplier’s level, this task might 
vary from controlling how much pesticide being used to grow the raw material to how 
well performed is one special technique used to extract this material. At Manufacture’s 
level, the task of quality control consists of, apart from ensuring minimum standard for 
raw material bought from suppliers, guaranteeing suitable environment for storing the 
raw material and half made products, assuring the correct assemble process, avoiding 
vary kinds of contamination… 
Quality can imply different cost depending on which are the requirements of the final 
customers, the selling price, the impact that will result on manufacture’s and supplier’s 
level if a failed final product reach to a customer, the cost to destroy a half-made 
product or re-manufacture it when detecting quality failure and other kinds of 
consequences. 
Depending on each company’s long and short-term goals, they apply different 
strategies for quality control. And therefore effort invested into checking the right 
standard of product can differ. But when signing a contract between supplier and 
manufacture, there should exist some clauses that limits the minimum effort invested 
from each parts. So, how much effort should be invested from supplier level and how 
much from the manufacturer’s? Moreover, if one failed product reached to a costumer, 
which can have consequences as product recall, business interruption or reputation 
damage for both manufacturer and supplier, who is responsible for what percentage 
of the overall damage? 
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In this paper we are giving two practical examples in which this two stage model can 
be applied.  The first of them is a very simple, authentically one supplier and one 
manufacturer that produce one final product and then sell it either to retailer or final 
costumer. It is about a wine making company named Sutter Home Winery, which had 
some serious quality problem on its level of arsenics contained in their bottles (see 
case 1). The second example given is a multiple stage supply chain which manufactures 
one final product, requiring multiple components, each of them provided by different 
suppliers. In this case, we choose two consequent stages within this multiple stage 
supply chain and consider the next stage as our final costumer. In addition, we simplify 
the multiple supplier as one supplier that provides on key component of diverse 
standards in quality (see case 2).  
 
Case 1: 
Sutter Home Winery is one of the largest family-run independent wineries in 
the United States. It is located in California and they sell wine under twenty 
other labels including Newman’s Own and Folie à Deux. Currently, their annual 
production is about 20 million cases with Sutter Home White Zinfandel making 
up a good percent of the sales. 
Recently, a piece of news published by CNN on the 29th of March 2015 raised 
public concern about its high level of content of arsenic in their products, 
among other brand of cheap Californian wine. [1] 
Here is a list of wines that are claimed to have high levels of arsenic, as high as 
500% higher than what is considered acceptable by U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration Standards. The following list shows the brand names of 
contaminated wines: Sutter Home Sauvignon Blanc 2010, Sutter Home 
Gewurztraminer 2011, Sutter Home Pink Moscato, Sutter Home Pinot Grigio 
2011, Sutter Home Moscato, Sutter Home Chenin Blanc 2011, Sutter Home 
Sweet Red 2010, Sutter Home Riesling 2011, Sutter Home White Merlot 2011, 
Sutter Home Merlot 2011, Sutter Home White Zinfandel 2011, Sutter Home 
White Zinfandel 2012, Sutter Home Zinfandel 2010 
Inorganic arsenic has been classified as a human carcinogen by the 
Environmental Protection Agency. It is naturally occurring in the air, soil, and 
water. These natural factors, in turn, have an unpredictable effect on the levels 
of arsenic in many foods and beverages. In the case of wine, grape is the main 
raw material and it can naturally contain some level of arsenic depending on 
the soil that has been cultivated and the pesticide or water used during its 
growing process. All these factors together build in the risk at supplier’s level 
and effort must be invested for checking the level of contamination. 
But also, in the manufacture process, the possibility of contamination increase 
as the winemaking process progresses as well as arsenic contamination changes 
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can occur during fermentation. Moreover, other kind of contamination can also 
occur during this process, such as chemical residuals left after fermentation by 
bacteria, which can also be damaging to consumer’s health. These factors 
construct the risk at manufacture’s level, which is independent of the risk in 
supplier’s level. However, when it comes to determine the effort needed to 
fulfill minimum quality standards, the manufacturer will always chose own 
effort level after observing supplier’s effort. 
Once the contaminated wine reaches to the client, in other words, 
contaminated product has not been noticed by the supplier or manufacturer, as 
this case has evidenced, both manufacturer and supplier have severe 
consequences, such as cost of product recall, reputation damage, loss of sales…  
(see Annex 1) 
Case 2: 
On the 25th of August 2014, Apple announced a recall program for their sold 
units of IPhone 5 between September 2012 and January 2013. The recall 
offered to replace batteries for free after receiving a huge amount of complains 
from their customers.  “The sold units experienced a shorter battery life or 
needed to be charged more frequently”, as Apple phrase it. [2] 
Battery life durability is a key feature when choosing a smartphone for 
nowadays costumers. But even such a popular and successful company as 
Apple struggles to reach the quality required for their products.  
There are several suppliers for Apple’s product, some of them publicly known, 
for instance Samsung SDI, Amperex Technology Limited and Tianjin Lishen 
Battery. But we have no trustful information about which are the companies 
providing IPhone 5’s batteries, since this is confidential information. 
Nevertheless, we know that the recall program mentioned before should be a 
shared responsibility both for Apple’s company and the suppliers. Then what 
percent of responsibility assumed each part? 
This case can be simulated into a two-stage supply chain. Let’s simplify the 
several suppliers as only one supplier that needs to meet Apple’s specifications 
for its IPhone5. Then once batteries are provided, Apple’s factories assembles 
the final product by combining the battery and other components (which are 
not included in this study). At manufacture’s level, there is also a risk of not 
assembling the battery at the right way or may the software implemented not 
be efficient and therefore causes a quick drain of battery. 
Once the failed batteries reaches to the costumer, consequences must be hold 
by supplier and manufacturer. For this example, Apple lost reputation for their 
image of supreme quality, lost trust from their customers, had to promote a 
recall program and dealt with sales lost. Supplier may had to remunerate part 
of the recall program, assume part of sale lost and take up lost reputation for 
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other customers or Apple’s future orders. These consequences must be taken 
into account when formulating a contract; penalization and responsibilities for 
each part should be clearly stipulated for the best of both parts. (see annex 2) 
2. Literature Review 
 
Quality can be improved in this two-stage model through two methods: supplier 
selection and cost penalties. The first is not included in this study, since we are 
suppose in our case that this selection has already been carried out. The second, cost 
penalties forces the involved parts, both supplier and manufacture, to fulfil the 
according terms specified in contract and satisfy the customers’ requirements. 
Therefore the main objective in this paper is to study how to sign a quality-sensitive 
contract with cost penalty between the supplier and manufacturer. 
There exist significant and growing amount of literature about of quality in supply 
chain. If quality in products is not specified in clear clauses, suppliers may attempt to 
supply substandard products (Friedman [3], 1986; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991[4]; 
Moulin, 1995[5]). 
After firms started to detail quality terms in their contracts with suppliers, there has 
been a growing interest and studies about how to improve quality in supply chains. 
Reyniers and Tapiero, 1995 [6], study the risk and impact of strategic quality control, 
both in a cooperative and non-cooperative game, which implies the motivation and 
preferences of each of the parties. The crucial advantage of according terms of quality 
in a contract is to protect both parties by reducing uncertainty and stabilize their 
respective production environment. Tagaras and Lee,  
1996[7], explore the relationship between the suppliers quality input and the 
imperfections of the manufacturing process. This may involve contracts to bind both 
implying parts to deliver products of ‘acceptable’ quality and reduce uncertainty. 
Starbird [8], 1997 studies the effect of the buyer’s level of inspection on the supplier’s 
quality level. Baiman et al. [9], 2000, analyse the relation between product quality, the 
cost of quality and the information available for each part when signing a contract, in 
which the supplier is responsible for prevention cost of selling defective products and 
the manufacturer or buyer is responsible for appraisal cost to identify defects. 
Starbird [10], 2001 extended his previous study to the effect of penalties, rewards and 
inspection policies on the behaviours of a cost minimizing supplier. Kashi R. 
Balachandran, Suresh Radhakrishnan [11], 2005, examine contract’s penalty/warranty 
terms based on incoming inspection and external failure information. Kaijie Zhu, 
Rachel Q. Zhang, Fugee Tsung [12], 2007, study the quality-improvement 
interaction with the operational-descisons and explores the role of different 
parties in quality-improvement. Tapiero and Kogan [13], 2007, prolonged Reyniers 
and Tapiero 1995 by providing a comparative and economic approach to strategic 
quality control in a supply chain.  
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3. Model 
 
We study a two-stage serial supply chain with one manufacturer and one supplier. The 
manufacturer purchases a key raw material from the supplier and converts it into a 
final product that is sold to resellers or end customers. There is a risk of quality failure 
(i.e., contamination) in the chain and this represents health consequences for the 
public when a contaminated product reaches the end customer. Let 𝑟𝑠 denote the 
probability of a contamination at the supplier level. Any contaminated item that has 
been undetected by the supplier is passed to the manufacturer. Independent of the 
supplier’s contamination risk, the product may be contaminated at the manufacturer’s 
level with probability 𝑟𝑚.  
Both the supplier and the manufacturer may exert costly efforts for quality control and 
inspection. Let  𝑒𝑠  ≥ 0 denote the supplier’s effort level and  𝑒𝑚  ≥ 0 
denote the manufacturer’s effort level. For simplicity, we assume that 
the cost of quality control is linear in the effort level, that is, 𝑐𝑠𝑒𝑠  and 
𝑐𝑚𝑒𝑚  , where  𝑐𝑠  and  𝑐𝑚  can be considered as the marginal quality 
control cost. We map the effort level to the success rate of 
contamination detection with a function 𝑝(. )  such that 𝑝(0) = 0 ,  
𝑝′(𝑒) > 0,  𝑝′′(𝑒) < 0 and 𝑃(𝑒) → 1  when 𝑒 → ∞. In particular, we 
assume that the probability the supplier detects a contaminated item is 
𝑝𝑠(𝑒𝑠) = 𝑒𝑠/(𝑒𝑠 + 1), and that the manufacturer’s detection probability 
function is 𝑝𝑚(𝑒𝑚) = 𝑒𝑚/(𝑒𝑚 + 1). Assuming 100% inspection rate or 
equivalently assuming that a single product flows through the supply 
chain, the probability of a public health threat can be calculated as 
follows: 𝑝(𝑒𝑠, 𝑒𝑚) = 𝑟𝑠(1 − 𝑝𝑠(𝑒𝑠))(1 − 𝑝𝑚(𝑒𝑚)) + (1 − 𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑚(1 −
𝑝𝑚(𝑒𝑚)). We assume that the public welfare cost associated with such 
an event is P, which could include costs such product recall, business 
interruption, and reputation damage. When a contaminated item is 
detected in the chain, it is destructed at a per-unit cost of 𝑑𝑠 or 𝑑𝑚  
depending on whether the item is detected by the supplier or the 
manufacturer. Due to value-adding operations, we assume it is less 
costly to destruct a component than a final product, that is,  𝑑𝑠 ≤ 𝑑𝑚.  
For illustration, suppose the supplier incurs 𝑘 𝑥 100% of the public health threat cost 
𝑃 while the manufacturer’s share is (1 − 𝑘) = 𝑘 𝑥 100%. Here, 𝑘 is assumed to be an 
exogenous parameter which might Preprint submitted to Elsevier April 3, 2015 e 
determined via a previously negotiated contract. For 𝑘 > 0, we assume that 𝑘𝑃 > 𝑑𝑚 
and 𝑘𝑃 > 𝑑𝑠. Suppose also that destruction costs are incurred by the agent who 
detects the contamination. Then, the total costs of the supplier and the manufacturer 
include quality control cost, destruction cost, and own share of the public welfare cost.  
𝐶𝑚(𝑒𝑚, 𝑒𝑠) =
𝑐𝑚𝑒𝑚 + 𝑝(𝑒𝑠, 𝑒𝑚)𝑘𝑃 + [𝑟𝑠(1 − 𝑝𝑠(𝑒𝑠))𝑝𝑚(𝑒𝑚) + (1 − 𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑚𝑝𝑚(𝑒𝑚)]𝑑𝑚       (1) 
8 
 
𝐶𝑠(𝑒𝑠, 𝑒𝑚) = 𝑐𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝑝(𝑒𝑠, 𝑒𝑚)𝑘𝑃 + 𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑠(𝑒𝑠)𝑑𝑠                                                                                  
(2) 
In a decentralized chain where members make their effort level decisions 
independently, if an agent is not responsible for any portion of 𝑃, that is 𝑘 = 0 or 
𝑘 = 1, then that agent’s optimal decision will be to exert no effort in quality control. 
 
3.1 List of variables 
As follow there is a clear list of variables with its units: 
𝑟𝑠: Probability of contamination at the supplier level (% units of a batch) 
𝑟𝑚: Probability of contamination at manufacturer’s level (% units of a batch) 
𝑒𝑠:  Supplier’s effort level (supervised units of a batch) 
𝑒𝑚: Manufacturer’s effort level (supervised units of a batch) 
𝑐𝑠: Marginal quality control cost at supplier’s level ($ per unit) 
𝑐𝑚: Marginal quality control cost at manufacture’s level ($ per unit) 
𝑝(. ): Rate of contamination detection (% of units per batch) 
𝑑𝑠: Destructed unit cost at supplier’s level ($ per unit destructed at supplier’s 
level) 
𝑑𝑚: Destructed unit cost at manufacturer’s level ($ per unit destructed at 
manufacturer’s level) 
𝑃 : Public health threat cost ($ per contaminated unit that reached to 
customer) 
𝐶𝑚: Total quality control at manufacturer’s level ($ per batch) 
𝐶𝑠: Total quality control at supplier’s level ($ per batch) 
𝑘: Parameter of responsibility if a contaminated item reached to customer (k x % 
for supplier and (1-k) for manufacturer) 
 
There are several issues that need to be addressed before starting to solve this 
problem numerically. First, we need to give an initialling value for each fixes variables, 
which evidently can vary for different cases. In this paper we only simulating for the 
two cases exposed above, the winery and iPhone 5 case. Second, we suppose that in 
all the cases being studies the batch size is 100 units, this is due to the fact that we 
defined 𝑝, the rate of contamination detection the following properties: 𝑝(0) = 0,  
𝑝′(𝑒) > 0,  𝑝′′(𝑒) < 0 and 𝑝(𝑒) → 1 when 𝑒 → ∞. It is not realistic to fix effort level 
infinite, each batch has a determined size, so we fix it to 100, this make our 
supposition pretty close to (𝑒) ≅ 𝑝(100) → 1 .  
3.2. Sharing Public Welfare Cost  
When it comes to sign a contract between two parts, in this case the supplier and the 
manufacturer, there must be a term in which responsibility for Public Welfare Cost 
must be clearly divided. In this mathematical model that we try to simulate, the term is 
represented by the parameter  𝑘 . When a contaminated product reached to a 
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customer, consequences of it which we denominate Public health threat cost P must 
be shared between the two participant parts. But what % is a fair distribution? And 
once 𝑘 is fixed in the contract, what’s the optimal, minimal quality cost for each side? 
3.2.1. Supplier leads the quality efforts  
In the first model, assume that the supplier acts as the leader and makes the effort 
level decision𝑒𝑠; next, the manufacturer chooses own effort level 𝑒𝑚 after observing 𝑒𝑠. 
For a given 𝑒𝑠, the manufacturer solves the problem 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑚≥0𝐶𝑚(𝑒𝑚, 𝑒𝑠)where the 
cost function is given in (1) and determines best response function, 𝑒𝑚
𝑏 (𝑒𝑠) . 
Anticipating the manufacturer’s best response, the supplier solves the problem 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠≥0𝐶𝑠(𝑒𝑠, 𝑒𝑚
𝑏 (𝑒𝑠))where the cost function is given in (2). Then, (𝑒𝑠
∗, 𝑒𝑚
∗ )constitute 
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium pair if and only if 𝑒𝑠
∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠≥0𝐶𝑠(𝑒𝑠, 𝑒𝑚
𝑏 (𝑒𝑠)) 
and 𝑒𝑚
∗ = 𝑒𝑚
𝑏 (𝑒𝑠
∗) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑚≥0𝐶𝑚(𝑒𝑚, 𝑒𝑠
∗)). 
3.2.2. Manufacturer leads the quality efforts 
In the second model, assume that the manufacturer acts as the leader and makes the 
effort level decision𝑒𝑚; next, the supplier chooses own effort level 𝑒𝑠 after observing 
𝑒𝑚. For a given 𝑒𝑚, the supplier solves the problem 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠≥0𝐶𝑠(𝑒𝑠, 𝑒𝑚)where the cost 
function is given in (2) and determines best response function, 𝑒𝑠
𝑏(𝑒𝑚). Anticipating 
the manufacturer’s best response, the supplier solves the problem 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑚≥0𝐶𝑚(𝑒𝑚, 𝑒𝑠
𝑏(𝑒𝑚)) where the cost function is given in (1). Then, 
(𝑒𝑠
∗, 𝑒𝑚
∗ )constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium pair if and only if 𝑒𝑠
∗ =
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠≥0𝐶𝑠(𝑒𝑠, 𝑒𝑚
𝑏 (𝑒𝑠)) and 𝑒𝑚
∗ = 𝑒𝑚
𝑏 (𝑒𝑠
∗) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑚≥0𝐶𝑚(𝑒𝑚, 𝑒𝑠
∗)). 
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4. Numerical simulation 
 
The model is simulated with the program Matlab and plotted in 3D with the following 
parameters, which are a rough estimation of the real case. For instance, we suppose 
that inheriting risk at supplier’s level is about 5% and in the winery case, the risk at 
manufacturer’s is higher (3%) than the risk at Apple company since Apple has better 
automatic control of all the processes, which means that it has lower standard 
deviations in quality. The cost of quality control per unit is estimated thought the 
selling price of the final product and its standard of expected quality. The same is 
applied to destruction cost and public wealth threat cost. 
The numerical data applied to each case might not be very accurate, but since this 
model can be applied to most products and cost and prices vary depending on the 
place of production, company’s policy, time, etc. The results obtained in this paper and 
the simulations done is just some examples to illustrate the utility of this model. 
On Annex 3 you can find the Matlab program that we built in order to make all the 
simulations showed below.  
Winery case 
parameter Value Unit 
𝑟𝑠 0.05 % units of a batch 
𝑟𝑚 0.02 % units of a batch 
𝑐𝑠 0.05 $ per unit 
𝑐𝑚 0.08 $ per unit 
𝑑𝑠 0.10 $ per unit destructed at 
supplier’s level 
𝑑𝑚 0.20 $ per unit destructed at 
manufacturer’s level 
𝑃 1000 $ per contaminated unit that 
reached to customer 
 
If k=0 
For k equals to zero, meaning that if supplier does not incur in the sharing of 
responsibility of health threat cost, it seems obvious that the supplier part will not 
make any effort in quality control. The values of the parameters are estimate 
according to the selling price of a bottle of cheap wine, which is the case exposed. We 
are here estimating that one bottle of Californian wine is averagely sold at the price of 
1,5 US$, therefore the total cost of a batch of 100 wine should not cost more 
than 100 US$ accounting supplier’s plus manufacture’s cost. Checking on the 
grafts below, resulting from simulating the model, we can see and we expected 
that no quality control would cost more money for the manufacturer. Since 
supplier has no responsibility on public threat cost, it is obvious to expect that 
this part will do no control, therefore manufacturer will suppose 𝑒𝑠 equals to zero. 
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Assuming that our model is right, manufacturer would decide to do quality control 
only under the permission of having a profit on its product. 
So, if quality cost exceed the 15% of total cost of the product, which means 15 US 
dollars per batch invested in quality it makes no sense in this business. As we can see 
in the Figure 1, the lowest cost hold by manufacturing part in quality is around 20 US 
dollars per batch, this conclusion is non-sense to manufacturing part. For k=0, 
manufacturing part will not sign any contract with the supplier, unless the public 
health cost per unit P is very low comparatively to the quality control cost, which in 
this case should not be higher than 200 US dollars. 
 
 
Figure 1 manufacturer’s total control cost at k=0 
At supplier’s part, if k=0 this part have no interest in guessing what will be 
manufacturer’s response as it has no responsibility to take. It will automatically skip 
control to invest as little as possible in quality, but the consequence of it may not be 
favourable to him, if manufacturer part decide to not collaborate with supplier’s part. 
But this is an issue not being studied in this paper. Below, in the figure 2 is shown the 
total control cost assumed by supplier, as it can be expected is much lower compared 
to manufacturers.  Even it can reach to no cost, however this might not be a realistic 
case to suppose k equals to zero. 
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Figure 2 supplier’s total control cost at k=0 
 
IF k=0.5 
If responsibility is shared at the same proportion between supplier and manufacturer. At the 
manufacturer’s part, assuming the best response of the supplier which is to do an effort of 
checking 18.6% it’s supplied row material, seeing the results of cost function, manufacturer 
will decide to do an effort of 9.64% which matches to the minimum total cost of 3.85 US 
dollars per batch. This is a cost that is perfectly assumable by manufacturer and it is realistic. 
 
 
Figure 3 Manufacturer's total control cost at k=0.5 
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Similarly, for an equal share of responsibility, supplier’s control cost depends on the 
manufacturer’s effort. In the supplier’s total control cost model, if manufacturer’s best 
response is expected, which in this case is 𝑒𝑚=8.71%, the relative lowest total control 
cost for supplier is 3.45 US dollars per batch with an effort of 𝑒𝑠=11.32%. 
 
figure 4 Supplier's total control cost at k=0.5 
 
If k=1 
The result for this simulation is exactly inversely equal to the case of k=0, but the major control 
cost is assumed by the supplier. It is, as well as the case of k=0, unrealistic to happen in reality, 
since no enterprise would invest more in quality that its profit margin. The minimum cost 
requires for the supplier is around 25 US dollars per batch and we are supposing that total 
selling price for supplier’s raw material is around 20 US dollars. Obviously, this is only a case to 
study in theory. (see graphics in annex 4) 
 
Optimal k for minimal total control cost in both levels 
In order to find the optimal total cost for both supplier and manufacturer, being the 
perfect couple of effort applied by each level 𝑒𝑠
∗, 𝑒𝑚
∗ , we have simulated through the 
model with Matlab with a k_step equal to 0.1 (see simulations in Annex 4). We found 
out that the perfect couple can be found at the agreement level of k=0.64. In this case 
of Winery, optimal effort in control at supplier level would be  𝑒𝑠
∗ = 14,32% and 𝑒𝑚
∗ = 
14,74, which means a total control cost of 1,66 US dollar per batch for the supplier and 
a total cost of 1,75 US dollars per batch for the manufacturer. 
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Figure 5 Optimal k for lowest control cost at both levels 
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IPhone 5 case 
  
Parameter Value Unit 
𝑟𝑠 0.05 % units of a batch 
𝑟𝑚 0.01 % units of a batch 
𝑐𝑠 2.5 $ per unit 
𝑐𝑚 15 $ per unit 
𝑑𝑠 5 $ per unit destructed at supplier’s 
level 
𝑑𝑚 50 $ per unit destructed at 
manufacturer’s level 
𝑃 100000 $ per contaminated unit that 
reached to customer 
 
Estimations are based on the basis of IPhone 5 market price. In this paper we suppose 
that IPhone 5 battery production cost per unit is 25 US dollars and a finished product 
by manufacturer, or what is called the product cost is 150 US dollars. This makes 125 
US dollars production cost per unit left for the manufacturer.  
If k=0 
As in the previous case, we suppose a batch of a hundred units to simplify the 
understanding of the numerical results. As the reader can see, the size of the batch 
does not incur in the results, it is set to 100 units only to facilitate he results.  
So, if the batch is 100 units, and manufacturer cost of producing a unit of IPhone 5 is 
around 125 US dollars and supposing a maximum investment of 15% of total cost in 
quality control, which is a really high percentage, the maximum total control cost 
admissible would be under 1875 US dollars. Checking on the grafts below, resulting 
from simulating the model, we can see and we expected that no quality control would 
cost more money for the manufacturer. Since supplier has no responsibility on public 
threat cost, it is obvious to expect that this part will do no control, therefore 
manufacturer will suppose 𝑒𝑠  equals to zero. Assuming that our model is right, 
manufacturer would decide to do quality control only under the permission of having a 
profit on its product. And the best option is to do 100% inspection of the units since P 
is too high to be assumed by the manufacturer, if a contaminated units reaches to a 
customer. 
The main difference between this case and the previous one is that even if k=0, 
meaning that supplier has no responsibility in the Public Health Cost which is 
represented by P, the manufacturer’s total control cost is still affordable, although high. 
This is due to the cause that the profit margin for the manufacturer is way higher than 
the supplier. And maybe, another reason would be that risk is quite lower at 
manufacturer level than supplier’s since Apple Inc is a high-tech company and there is 
a very high standard of quality implemented already. 
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figure 6 manufacturer’s total control cost at k=0 
At supplier’s level, for a k=0, no quality control at all would be the best choice for this 
part. It should skip all quality control process to cut down cost since no responsibility is 
required from his part. Below, in the figure 2 is shown the total control cost assumed 
by supplier, as it can be expected is much lower compared to manufacturers.  Even it 
can reach to no cost, however this might not be realistic, if a supplier provides bad 
quality products is not probable to be chosen as supplier for a company such as Apple 
Inc. So this case is unrealistic. 
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figure 7 Supplier’s total control cost at k=0 
For k=0.5 
 
If Health Threat Cost P is equally shared by both implied parts, manufacturer and 
supplier’s difference at cost at control is dismounted. Assuming the best response 
from the supplier, which means an 𝑒𝑠=7,32%, the manufacturer’s minimum control 
cost can be reached by doing an  𝑒𝑚=8.71%. The result of this combination, which is 
the result expected by the manufacturer has a total control cost of 345,87 US dollars 
per batch. Compared to the maximum admissible, which is 1875 US dollars per batch, 
this total control cost is totally affordable by the manufacturer. 
Similarly, for an equal share of responsibility, supplier’s control cost depends on the 
manufacturer’s effort. In the supplier’s total control cost model, if manufacturer’s best 
response is expected, which in this case is 𝑒𝑚=4.76%, the relative lowest total control 
cost for supplier is 563.76 US dollars per batch with an effort of 𝑒𝑠=7.85%. This might 
be a too high cost to the supplier to bear and so, optimal k should be set in between 0 
and 0.5. 
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figure 7  Manufacturer’s total control cost at k=0.5 
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figure 8  Supplier’s total control cost at k=0.5 
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Optimal k for minimal total control cost in both levels 
 
In order to find the optimal total cost for both supplier and manufacturer, being the 
perfect couple of effort applied by each level 𝑒𝑠
∗, 𝑒𝑚
∗ , we have simulated through the 
model with Matlab with a k_step equal to 0.1 (see simulations in Annex 4). We found 
out that the perfect couple can be found at the agreement level of k=0.34. In this case 
of Winery, optimal effort in control at supplier level would be  𝑒𝑠
∗ = 2.75% and 𝑒𝑚
∗ = 
7.85%, which means a total control cost of 254.75US dollars per batch for the supplier 
and a total cost of 431.83US dollars per batch for the manufacturer. 
 
 
figure 8 Optimal k for lowest control cost at both levels 
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Annex 1 Arsenic contaminated wine news 
 
Should you be worried about arsenic in California wine? 
By Emanuella Grinberg, CNN 
Updated 2047 GMT (0347 HKT) March 29, 2015 
 
(CNN)A lawsuit that's stirring concern among drinkers of some California wine starts with a 
history lesson. 
The deaths of Napoleon Bonaparte, Simon Bolivar, King George III, King Faisal I and other 
prominent figures have been attributed to arsenic poisoning, the first paragraph of the 30-
page complaint says. 
And, now, drinkers of some California wine have become "unwitting 'guinea pigs' of arsenic 
exposure," thanks to the negligent and misleading actions of dozens of California wineries, 
according to the class action complaint filed March 19 on behalf of two California couples. 
The lawsuit does not include any allegations of physical injury or death due to arsenic 
consumption associated with drinking the wines named in the complaint. The plaintiffs are 
seeking monetary damages and a court order requiring the defendants disclose on the bottles 
the risks of consuming inorganic arsenic in wines and engage in "corrective advertising" 
regarding their conduct. 
News of the lawsuit, which broke last week, struck fear in the hearts of frugal wine consumers 
nationwide, prompting many to share lists on social media of labels named in the lawsuit, all 
but declaring the outcome a foregone conclusion. 
The complaint names 28 companies that represent 83 low-cost labels familiar to supermarket 
wine aisle shoppers: Cupcake, Franzia, Flipflop, Rex Goliath and Korbel, among others. Even 
the maker of Trader Joe's Charles Shaw Zinfandel varietal (affectionately known among fans as 
"two-buck Chuck"), was called out for allegedly failing to warn consumers that it contained 
"dangerously" high levels of inorganic arsenic. 
But should consumers start looking to other winemakers or other wine-producing states for 
gallon-sized bottles of zinfandel? Or is the lawsuit a fearmongering tactic being used to drum 
up business for the beverage-testing company used for the lawsuit, as some defendants and 
industry insiders have insinuated? 
Most of the defendants said their wine was safe to drink when contacted by CNN. Some 
declined to comment, citing the pending litigation. Others referred CNN to the Wine Institute, 
a California trade group that called the claims "false and misleading." 
"We are concerned that the irresponsible publicity campaign by the litigating party could scare 
the public into thinking that wine is not safe to consume, which is patently untrue," said the 
group, which represents 1,000 California wineries, including 10 of the defendants. 
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The lawsuit alleges that three separate labs "skilled in arsenic testing" independently 
confirmed that the defendants produce wines containing "dangerously" high levels of 
inorganic arsenic, in some cases up to 500% more than what is considered acceptable. 
 
"Put differently," the complaint states in bold letters, "just a glass or two of these arsenic-
contaminated wines a day over time could result in dangerous arsenic toxicity to the 
consumer." 
A spokesman from the public relations firm representing the plaintiffs and BeverageGrades, 
which performed the analysis, said the company is confident that its data is "based on sound 
scientific research." Because the company expects testing methodology to be at issue in 
litigation, it declined to reveal specific data or testing methods. 
"We understand the public interest in this story and look forward to resolving the litigation to 
make these products safer for consumers. And we hope the winemakers will take these 
findings just as seriously and work to make sure their wines are safe," spokesman Rob Feldman 
said. 
Without seeing the lab results, experts suggest reserving judgment based on the following 
issues to arise from the lawsuit: 
Trace amounts of arsenic naturally exist in food and water 
Arsenic is found in air, soil and water throughout the world. Therefore, it can also found in 
grains, fruits, vegetables and seafood due to absorption through soil and water. 
"Plants take up trace amounts of arsenic from the soil, and we have been ingesting these trace 
amounts for all of human history. Generally, these amounts are at levels well below that 
associated with either acute or chronic toxicity," said Cornell University's Gavin Lavi Sacks, 
director of undergraduate studies for the viticulture and enology program in the College of 
Agricultural and Life Sciences. 
Arsenic occurs in inorganic and organic forms. The FDA describes organic or naturally occurring 
arsenic as "essentially harmless." Inorganic arsenic has been classified as a human carcinogen 
by the Environmental Protection Agency. 
The first time the U.S. Food and Drug Administration set limits for arsenic levels in food or 
drink was in 2013, when it proposed to limit the amount of inorganic arsenic in apple juice to 
10 parts per billion. 
Long-term exposure to inorganic arsenic, mainly through smoking, drinking contaminated 
water, eating food prepared with contaminated water or eating food irrigated with arsenic-
rich water, can lead to health risks such as cancer and skin lesions. 
According to the lawsuit, inorganic arsenic makes up the "overwhelming majority" of arsenic in 
wines at issue, despite the winemakers' ability to limit inorganic arsenic through "responsible 
winemaking procedures" and "sophisticated testing equipment." 
Without providing specific data, the plaintiffs said their analysis found inorganic arsenic "far in 
excess" of what's allowed in drinking water based on the EPA's standard for arsenic in drinking 
water: 10 parts per billion. 
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But the EPA limit for water is based on total arsenic, including both organic and inorganic 
forms, leading some to question whether it's the best basis for comparison. 
The lawsuit uses the EPA standard for arsenic in drinking water as a reference point 
This standard is set to protect consumers served by public water systems from the effects of 
long-term, chronic exposure to arsenic, EPA spokeswoman Tara Johnson said in an email. It's 
based on how much water people typically drink daily, which ranges from one to two liters, 
she said. 
However, the EPA standard for arsenic in drinking water "is of limited use when considering 
any potential health risks related to arsenic in wine," FDA spokeswoman Lauren Sucher said in 
an email to CNN. 
"People drink far more water than they do wine over their lifetimes, and they start drinking 
water earlier in life. Thus, both the amount and period of exposure are different and would 
require separate analyses," she said. 
Seeing as the USDA recommends drinking about 10 cups of water a day and no more than two 
alcoholic drinks (about 1 cup of wine) a day, "a sensible concentration limit for arsenic in wine 
should be at least 10-fold higher than for drinking water, and possibly higher, since we also use 
water for cooking and cleaning," Sacks of Cornell University said. 
This is roughly the case in countries that have established limits for arsenic in wine, which 
leads to the next point: 
California wine is good enough for countries with established standards for arsenic in wine 
The U.S. Tax and Trade Bureau regulates the production of alcoholic beverages, and part of 
this process is testing wine for arsenic, said Erika Holmes, spokeswoman for Washington State 
University's Viticulture and Enology school. 
Even though the FDA has not established a standard for acceptable levels of arsenic in wine, 
California wine exports are tested and found to be below the established limits for export, 
Holmes said in an email. 
Countries that import California wine also test for arsenic using their own standards: 100 parts 
per billion in Canada and 200 parts per billion in Europe -- 10 to 20 times higher than the 
drinking water limit in the United States. 
"It's certainly appropriate to look to other countries' regulations for guidance," Sacks said. 
"Their regulators are presumably looking at the same body of research that U.S. regulators 
would look to if they were to establish a mandatory limit for wine." 
The company that performed the analysis also sells alcohol analysis services 
The day CBS News aired a segment on the lawsuit, the company that performed the analysis 
sent out a news release offering its services to provide "reassurance from arsenic in wine" 
through "a tool for screening their offerings to ensure the quality of their supply chain." 
Neither BeverageGrades nor its CEO, Kevin Hicks, is a party to the lawsuit. But Hicks' 
appearance in the segment prompted detractors to cry conflict of interest. 
25 
 
In a statement to CNN, Hicks said it was concerning that some winemakers would point to this 
as a conflict of interest "instead of focusing on making sure their product contains the lowest 
amount of contaminants possible." 
He also defended his company's right to offer its services to retailers, saying he will continue to 
do so. 
"The arsenic data in my testing is based on years of scientific research and operating a 
commercial chemistry lab for over two years. As a commercial lab no one should be surprised 
that BeverageGrades has been offering lab testing services to the alcohol beverage industry 
since July 2013." 
A previous version of this story incorrectly stated that the brand Barefoot was a named 
defendant in the lawsuit. It is not. This story has been corrected. CNN sincerely regrets the 
error. 
 
Is Your Favorite Wine Tainted with Arsenic? 
Does your wine make the list? 
 
You’ve likely browsed through the wine selection at Trader Joe’s (among other stores) and 
thought – wow, I could drink wine that’s cheaper than bottled water! Many Trader Joe’s 
customers have flocked to the store for years to get their hands on some cheap vino, but there 
are some nasty, carcinogenic toxins in that wine which may cause you to think again before 
picking up a bottle for your next dinner party. 
How About Some Inorganic Arsenic with That Cheese? 
It turns out that among hundreds of wineries (many of which supply stores like Trader Joe’s), 
vintages both old and young contain dangerous levels of arsenic. 
Wine industry spokespersons among the 28 wineries that are defendants in a current lawsuit 
point out that the wine industry in Europe, Canada, and the USA has its own arsenic level 
standards for wine, amounting to 100 parts per billion. Despite this, approximately half of the 
wine recently tested had higher arsenic levels than even the EPA’s standards allow. 
Though the class action suit has yet to appear before a judge or jury, consumers can make 
their own informed decisions now, about what kind of wine they are willing to drink. 
The lawsuit stems from Kevin Hicks, a former wine distributor who started BeverageGrades, a 
Denver-based lab that tested 1,300 bottles of California wine. The lab found that about a 
quarter of them had higher levels of arsenic than the maximum limit allowed in water. 
The most alarming fact – the cheaper the wine, the higher the levels of arsenic. So, that trip to 
Trader Joe’s means you are drinking poison for pennies. 
Specific labels of Trader Joes’ named Charles Shaw or “Two-Buck Chuck,” Sutter Home, Franzia, 
Beringer, and Cupcake were among the cheap wines with the highest levels of arsenic. 
The lawsuit alleges that the contaminated wines are cheaper in part because their producers 
don’t “implement the proper methods and processes to reduce inorganic arsenic.” 
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Whether this is done at the winery, by the bottler, or by the wine grower – it doesn’t matter. 
No one should be drinking wine that has such high levels of toxicity. 
The lawsuit seeks measures to attain arsenic levels which are closer to the EPA’s 10 parts per 
billion (arsenic to water)standard, and not boast of 50 parts to billion, which is highly alarming. 
The following wines are the subjects of the class action lawsuit. You can also check this site to 
see the wines which turned up the lowest amounts of heavy metals. 
Acronym GR8RW Red Blend 2011 
Almaden Heritage White Zinfandel 
Almaden Heritage Moscato 
Almaden Heritage White Zinfandel 
Almaden Heritage Chardonnay 
Almaden Mountain Burgundy 
Almaden Mountain Rhine 
Almaden Mountain Chablis 
Arrow Creek Coastal Series Cabernet Sauvignon 2011 
Bandit Pinot Grigio 
Bandit Chardonnay 
Bandit Cabernet Sauvignon 
Bay Bridge Chardonnay 
Beringer White Merlot 2011 
Beringer White Zinfandel 2011 
Beringer Red Moscato 
Beringer Refreshingly Sweet Moscato 
Charles Shaw White Zinfandel 2012 
Colores del Sol Malbec 2010 
Glen Ellen by Concannon’s Glen Ellen Reserve Pinot Grigio 2012 
Concannon Selected Vineyards Pinot Noir 2011 
Glen Ellen by Concannon’s Glen Ellen Reserve Merlot 2010 
Cook Spumante 
Corbett Canyon Pinot Grigio 
Corbett Canyon Cabernet Sauvignon 
Cupcake Malbec 2011 
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Fetzer Moscato 2010 
Fetzer Pinot Grigio 2011 
Fisheye Pinot Grigio 2012 
Flipflop Pinot Grigio 2012 
Flipflop Moscato 
Flipflop Cabernet Sauvignon 
Foxhorn White Zinfandel 
Franzia Vintner Select White Grenache 
Franzia Vintner Select White Zinfandel 
Franzia Vintner Select White Merlot 
Franzia Vintner Select Burgundy 
Hawkstone Cabernet Sauvignon 2011 
HRM Rex Goliath’s Moscato 
Korbel Sweet Rose Sparkling Wine 
Korbel Extra Dry Sparkling Wine 
Menage a Trois Pinot Grigio 2011 
Menage a Trois Moscato 2010 
Menage a Trois White Blend 2011 
Menage a Trois Chardonnay 2011 
Menage a Trois Rose 2011 
Menage a Trois Cabernet Sauvignon 2010 
Menage a Trois California Red Wine 2011 
Mogen David Concord 
Mogen David Blackberry Wine 
Oak Leaf White Zinfandel 
Pomelo Sauvignon Blanc 2011 
R Collection by Raymond’s Chardonnay 2012 
Richards Wild Irish Rose Red Wine 
Seaglass Sauvignon Blanc 2012 
Simply Naked Moscato 2011 
Smoking Loon Viognier 2011 
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Sutter Home Sauvignon Blanc 2010 
Sutter Home Gewurztraminer 2011 
Sutter Home Pink Moscato 
Sutter Home Pinot Grigio 2011 
Sutter Home Moscato 
Sutter Home Chenin Blanc 2011 
Sutter Home Sweet Red 2010 
Sutter Home Riesling 2011 
Sutter Home White Merlot 2011 
Sutter Home Merlot 2011 
Sutter Home White Zinfandel 2011 
Sutter Home White Zinfandel 2012 
Sutter Home Zinfandel 2010 
Trapiche Malbec 2012 
Tribuno Sweet Vermouth 
Vendange Merlot 
Vendange White Zinfandel 
Wine Cube Moscato 
Wine Cube Pink Moscato 2011 
Wine Cube Pinot Grigio 2011 
Wine Cube Pinot Grigio 
Wine Cube Chardonnay 2011 
Wine Cube Chardonnay 
Wine Cube Red Sangria 
Wine Cube Sauvignon Blanc 2011 
Wine Cube Cabernet Sauvignon/Shiraz 2011 
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Annex 2 IPhone 5 battery recall 
 
Apple has determined that a very small percentage of iPhone 5 devices may suddenly 
experience shorter battery life or need to be charged more frequently. The affected 
iPhone 5 devices were sold between September 2012 and January 2013 and fall within 
a limited serial number range. If your iPhone 5 is experiencing these symptoms and 
meets the eligibility requirements noted below, Apple will replace your iPhone 5 
battery, free of charge. 
Eligibility 
If your iPhone is in working order and exhibits the symptoms noted above, use the 
serial number checker below to see if it is eligible for this program. 
Replacement process 
Choose one of the service options below to have your battery replaced. Your iPhone 
will be examined prior to any service to verify that it is eligible for this program and in 
working order. 
Please call your service provider to confirm that battery replacement service is 
available on the day you visit them. 
 Apple Authorized Service Provider  
 Apple Retail Store  
 Apple Technical Support  
To prepare your iPhone 5 for the battery replacement process, please follow the steps 
below: 
 Back up your data to iTunes or iCloud 
 Turn off Find my iPhone 
 Erase data and settings in Settings > General > Reset > Erase all Content and 
Settings 
Note: If your iPhone 5 has any damage such as a cracked screen which impairs the 
replacement of the battery, that issue will need to be resolved prior to the battery 
replacement. In some cases, there may be a cost associated with the repair. 
Additional Information 
Apple may restrict or limit repair to the original country of purchase. If you believe 
your iPhone 5 was affected by this issue, and you paid to replace your battery, you 
can contact Apple about a refund. This worldwide Apple program doesn't extend the 
standard warranty coverage of the iPhone 5. 
The program covers affected iPhone 5 batteries for 3 years after the first retail sale of 
the unit. 
Information as of 2015-03-05 
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Annex 3 Matlab program for simulations 
 
% Plot the cost funtion  
% Parameters: 
 % rs: % units of a batch 
 % rm: % units of a batch 
 % ds: $ per unit destructed at supplier’s level 
 % dm: $ per unit destructed at manufacturer’s level 
 % cs: $ per unit 
 % cm: $ per unit 
 % P: $ per contaminated unit that reached to customer 
% Execution example: 
 % grafica2(0.05,0.03,0.2,0.5,0.045,0.15,20) 
 
function grafica2 (rs,rm,ds,dm,cs,cm,P) 
 close all; 
 % Defined values 
 limit_es = 100; 
 limit_em = 100; 
 step_es = 1; 
 step_em = 1; 
 step_k = 0.1; 
 
 %Number argument check 
 if nargin ~=7 
  error ('num argument error'); 
 end 
 % create the graphic folder 
    warning('off','MATLAB:MKDIR:DirectoryExists'); 
 err = mkdir ('graphics'); 
 if err ~= 1 
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  error ('error creating the folder graphics for the results'); 
 end  
 % init step of vector K values 
 vec_k= 0:step_k:1; 
 % init the grid [X,Y] (values for es and em) for the cost function 
 [es,em]= meshgrid(0:step_es:limit_es,0:step_em:limit_em); 
 
 %iteration for each k 
 for k= vec_k 
 
  %IMPORTANT NOTE: the .* and ./ operator is aplied to operate each element 
of a matrix/vector 
  % calculating the prob. of contamination detection -> supplier 
  ps_fun = es./(es+1); 
  % calculating the prob. of contamination detection -> manufactor 
  pm_fun = em./(em+1); 
  % calculating probability of a public health threat 
  p_fun = rs*(1-ps_fun).*(1-pm_fun)+(1-rs)*rm*(1-pm_fun); 
  % calculating manufactoring cost  
  Cost_m = cm*em+p_fun*(1-k)*P+(rs*(1-ps_fun).*pm_fun+(1-
rs)*rm*pm_fun)*dm; 
  % calculating supplier cost  
  Cost_s = cs*es+p_fun*k*P+rs*ps_fun*ds; 
 
  % set the name of the windows and title of the plot (manufactor) 
  name = strcat ('Manufactoring cost for k = ', num2str(k)); 
  % set windows name 
  figure('name',name,'NumberTitle','off'); 
  % plot 3d graphic 
  graph = surf(es,em,Cost_m); 
  % set labels, and title 
  title(name,'FontSize',12,'FontWeight','bold','Color','blue'); 
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   xlabel('e_{m} (unit)','FontSize',12,'FontWeight','bold','Color','blue'); 
     ylabel('e_{s} (unit)','FontSize',12,'FontWeight','bold','Color','blue'); 
  % save the result graphic to the graphic folder 
     saveas(graph,strcat('graphics/',name,'.png')); 
 
     % set the name of the windows and title of the plot (supplier) 
     name = strcat ('Supplier cost for k = ', num2str(k)); 
     % set windows name 
     figure('name',name,'NumberTitle','off'); 
     % set labels, and title 
  graph = surf(es,em,Cost_s); 
  title(name,'FontSize',12,'FontWeight','bold','Color','blue'); 
     xlabel('e_{m} (unit)','FontSize',12,'FontWeight','bold','Color','blue'); 
     ylabel('e_{s} (unit)','FontSize',12,'FontWeight','bold','Color','blue'); 
  % save the result graphic to the graphic folder 
     saveas(graph,strcat('graphics/',name,'.png')); 
 
 end 
  
end 
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Annex 4 Simulation graphics for winery case 
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Annex 5 simulation graphic for IPhone 5 case 
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